We provide a sufficient condition for the existence of a Markov perfect equilibrium for pure strategies in a class of Markov games where each stage has strategic complementarities. We assume that both the sets of actions for all players and the set of states are finite and that the horizon is also finite, while the past studies examined Markov games with infinite horizons where the sets of actions and states are assumed to be infinite. We give an elementary proof of the existence and apply the result to a game of Bertrand oligopoly with investment.
Introduction
A stochastic game is a collection of strategic form games indexed by a state variable. The players choose their actions according to a state, and this state changes from one period to the next according to a stochastic process that depends on the actions of all of the players. Stochastic games were introduced in [16] and Markov games, which provide the most typical and practical models in stochastic games, have been developed in the field of economics and operations research. A number of models of Markov games have been applied to interesting problems such as an oligopolistic industry with investment [9] , political economics [1] , and competition with inventory control or supply chain management [11] .
The existence of a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) in Markov games with infinite horizons is complex, as indicated by several studies [10, 15, 16] . In contrast, the existence of an MPE in Markov games with finite horizons and finite states is easily proved if we consider the finite set of actions allowing mixed strategies or if we assume that the sets of actions are compact in the metric space and that the payoff functions are concave and continuous. However, in terms of pure strategies for the finite set of actions, the existence problem remains to be solved.
Even a one-shot game such as rock-paper-scissors may not have a pure strategy equilibrium. Additional conditions are required to ensure the existence of equilibria in pure strategies for one-shot games. Games with strategic complementarities [12, 13, [17] [18] [19] [20] are included in the class that guarantees the existence of pure strategy equilibria in strategic form games * . However, even if each stage of a game has a strategic complementarity for a given Markov game, it is known that the Markov game itself may not preserve these strategic assumed to be an integer interval in R m :
for some a i , a i ∈ Z m . The n-tuple of actions for all players a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) is called an action profile. The set of action profiles is given by A, i.e., A = A 1 × · · · × A n .
The set of states, denoted by S ⊂ Z k , is also an integer interval in R k :
for some s, s ∈ Z k . A transition probability from state s ∈ S to s ′ ∈ S for an action profile a ∈ A is denoted by f (s ′ |s, a). The state at time t is denoted by s t , δ ∈ [0, 1] is a discount factor, and the (single-period) payoff function of player i is denoted by u i : S × A → R.
In stochastic games with observable actions, the action of each player at time t generally depends on time t, state s t , and both the history of action profiles and the history of states until time t−1. In this paper, we restrict the strategies of any player to Markovian strategies, in which the action of each player at time t depends only on time t and the state at time t. σ 
Now we define an MPE.
Definition 2.1 (MPE). A strategy profile σ
* is said to be a Markov Perfect Equilibrium if, for any i ∈ N , t ≤ T , and s ∈ S,
Under this definition, we find that the strategy profile σ * is an MPE if and only if, for any i ∈ N , t ≤ T , and s ∈ S,
Results
To describe a sufficient condition for the existence of an MPE, we add some notation and definitions.
For any
(1) For a fixed transition probability f , let P f (Ŝ|s, a) be the probability of the setŜ ⊆ S occurring with respect to f (s ′ |s, a), i.e.,
S ⊆ S is said to be an increasing set if s ′ ∈Ŝ and s ′′ ≥ s ′ imply s ′′ ∈Ŝ. The sufficient condition for the existence of equilibria provided by our result is described by the following eight assumptions. The first four conditions are assumptions about the payoff functions, whereas the latter four are assumptions about the transition probability.
(T1) For any s ∈ S and a −i ∈ A −i , f (·|s, a) is stochastically supermodular in a i :
for any increasing setŜ ⊆ S. (T2) For any s ∈ S, f (·|s, a) has stochastically increasing differences in (a i , a −i ):
for any increasing setŜ ⊆ S. (T3) For any a −i ∈ A −i , f (·|s, a) has stochastically increasing differences in (a i , s):
for any increasing setŜ ⊆ S.
Our main result is stated as follows. Theorem 3.
If a Markov game with a finite horizon satisfies (U1)-(U4) and (T1)-(T4), then (i) the game has an MPE
is also increasing in state s for any i ∈ N and for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
To prove Theorem 3.1, we state two lemmas. In these lemmas, we fix an arbitrary strategy profile σ and any time t ≥ 1. For any s ∈ S, let ϕ i (s) be the function from A to R defined as follows:
Note that ϕ i (s) is regarded as a payoff function of player i parameterized by s, and we can define a (one-shot) n-person game Γ(s) given a three-tuple
The following lemma states that this game Γ(s) has the greatest equilibrium, and the greatest equilibrium is increasing in s if (i) (U1)-(U3) and (T1)-(T3) are satisfied and
To prove the lemmas and the theorem, we use some properties and definitions of supermodular games on lattice theory [12, 13, 19] . These definitions and properties are summarized in the appendix.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose that (i) u i satisfies (U1)-(U3) and f satisfies (T1)-(T3) for any i ∈ N , and (ii) U t+1 i
(σ ≥t+1 )(s) is increasing in s. Then, the game Γ(s) has the greatest equilibrium a * (s), and a * (s) is increasing in s.
Proof. As f satisfies (T1) and U t+1 i
(σ ≥t+1 )(s) is increasing in s, (i) in Proposition A.3 implies the following (C1) by replacing x toŝ, y to a i and z to (s, a −i ):
Similarly, as f satisfies (T2) and U t+1 i (σ ≥t+1 )(s) is increasing in s, (ii) in Proposition A.3 implies the following (C2) by replacing x toŝ and (y, z) to (a i , a −i ):
(C2) and (U2) imply that ϕ i (s) has increasing differences in (a i , a −i ) for any s ∈ S:
)} s∈S is a family of supermodular games parameterized by s ∈ S. As f satisfies (T3) for any a −i ∈ A −i and U t+1 i (σ ≥t+1 )(s) is increasing in s, (ii) in Proposition A.3 implies the following (C3) by replacing x toŝ and (y, z) to (s, a i ): 
. Suppose that u i satisfies (U1)-(U4) and f satisfies (T1)-(T4) for any
Proof. By Lemma 3.2, the game Γ(s) has the greatest equilibrium a * (s), which is increasing in s. For any s ∈ S, let a * i (s) be a strategy of player i in equilibrium a * (s) and a * −i (s) be strategies of other players in equilibrium a * (s), respectively. Consider two states s
is an equilibrium strategy of player i for game Γ(s ′ ), the payoff of player i is non-increasing as the strategy changes from a *
Similarly,
because (3) and (4), we conclude that
Proof of Theorem 3.1. We consider a Markov game with the terminal period T . The proof is given by induction based on T . Suppose T = 0 and fix a state s. Then, the game is a one-shot n-person game. (U1)-(U3) imply that the game has the greatest equilibrium σ * 0 (s) = a * (s), which is increasing in s by Theorem A.1. (U4) implies that the payoff of the greatest equilibrium is increasing in s. Hence, (i)-(iii) hold for a Markov game with the terminal period T = 0.
Next, suppose that T ≥ 1 and (i)-(iii) hold for a Markov game with terminal period T − 1. As a subgame following t = 1 is a Markov game with T − 1 periods, there exists an MPE, according to the inductive hypothesis of (i). Hence, we denote the MPE of the subgame following t = 1 by σ * ≥1 = (σ 1 * , σ 2 * , . . . , σ T * ). The inductive hypotheses of (ii) and (iii) also imply that σ * ≥1 and U
for any i ∈ N , and consider a strategic form game Γ(s) = (N, ( 
is increasing in s by (r3). Inductive hypothesis (iii) implies that U
is also increasing in state s for any i ∈ N and for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Hence, (i)-(iii) hold for T . This concludes the proof.
An Application: Bertrand Oligopoly with Investment
One of the applications satisfying (U1)-(U4) and (T1)-(T4) is a Bertrand oligopoly game with investments, which is stated as follows. Firm i (i = 1, . . . , n) sells product i with price p i ∈ {p ∈ Z|0 ≤ p ≤p}. The demand for product i depends on both the prices of all types of products (p 1 , . . . , p n ) and the appeal of product i, s i . The accumulation of investment increases the appeal of product i, thereby increasing the demand for the product. At time t, firm i decides the price of product i, p i , and the amount of the investment I i ∈ {I ∈ Z|0 ≤ I ≤Ī}. The appeal of the product of firm i at time t is denoted by s t i and is given by s
is an increment in the appeal of the product. Thus, we assume that the increment in the appeal of product i depends only on the amount of investment by firm i, I i , and the current appeal of the product, s t i , because we ignore the spillover effects of investment by other firms. We also assume that h i (s i , I i ) is a random variable according to some distribution function F i defined by
The payoff of firm i is defined by
where c i ≥ 0 is the marginal cost of product i and k i ≥ 0 is the marginal cost of investment of firm i. D i (s i , p 1 , . . . , p n ) is the demand for product i when its appeal is s i and for prices (p 1 , . . . , p n ).
This Bertrand oligopoly game with investments can be modeled as a Markov game with a finite horizon T , finite actions, and a finite state. The set of states S ⊂ Z n is the set of n-tuples of the appeal of the products of all firms, given by
wheres i gives the upper bound of the appeal of product i. The set of actions of firm i is given by
To apply Theorem 3.1, we assume that the demand function D i is a linear function given by
for any s i , and that the probability distribution of the increment in the investment 
and for any x.
Then, we can establish the following result.
Proposition 4.1. If D i is given by (D1) and F i satisfies (F1) and (F2) for any i ∈ N , then (i) the game has an MPE, (ii) the price and the amount of investment is increasing in state s, for any t, and (iii) U t i (σ * ≥t )(s) is also increasing in state s for any i ∈ N and for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
Before proving Proposition 4.1, we present an example of F i satisfying (F1) and (F2):
whereh > 0 is the upper bound of the increment in the appeal of the product satisfyinḡ h <s i − s i , and ϵ is a constant satisfying ϵ ≤ 1/Ī. Note that F i (0|s i , I i ) > 0 for I i > 0, i.e., there is a positive probability that the increment in the appeal of the product is zero, even if the amount of investment I i is positive. We find that F i (h|s i , I i ) = 1 and that F i is increasing in y, and hence F i is a probability distribution function.
Choose arbitrary x, s 
Hence, (F1) holds. Similarly, (F2) holds by
Suppose that x ≥s. Then, x−s
, and (F1) and (F2) holds as an equality. Hence, we conclude that F i satisfies (F1) and (F2).
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Fix any firm i ∈ N . In the first part of the proof, we will assert that u i (s, a) satisfies (U1)-(U4). For any s ∈ S and a −i ∈ A −i , we obtain
Hence, (U1) holds as an equality. For any s ∈ S, a ′ i ≥ a i , and a
Then, (U2) holds. We find that (U3) holds by a calculation such as
Finally, (U4) also holds by a calculation such as
In the rest of the proof, we will show that the transition probability satisfies (T1)-(T4) if F i satisfies (F1)-(F2). IfŜ ⊆ S is an increasing set, thenŜ must be a rectangle in S of which the maximum point is (s 1 , . . . , s n ). Let x(Ŝ) = (ŝ 1 (Ŝ) . . .ŝ n (Ŝ)) be the minimum point ofŜ. Thus, for any increasing setŜ ⊆ S,Ŝ is denoted by
Then, for any increasing setŜ, we have
Fix arbitrary increasing setŜ, j ∈ N and a
and (F2) implies that
for any s
First, we show that (T1) holds in the equality. For any a ′ i , a i ∈ A i , s ∈ S, and increasing setŜ, we can assume I ′ I ≥ I i without loss of generality, and (Ŝ|s, a i , a −i ) . Second, we will show that (T2) is satisfied. For any s, a
, and any increasing setŜ,
where the inequality is obtained by (5) 
, where the first inequality is implied by (6) and the second inequality is implied by (5) setting
Finally, we will show that (T4) is true. For any a i ,s ′ ≥ s, a ′ −i ≥ a −i , and any increasing setŜ,
where the inequality is implied by (5).
Conclusions
The present paper established sufficient conditions for the existence of an MPE in pure strategies for a class of stochastic games with a finite horizon and finite states, in which any stage game has strategic complementarities for finite actions. The results for finite states and actions have advantages for numerical computation. Indeed, the computation of equilibria of Markov games has attracted a great deal of attention in the modeling of industrial dynamics [6, 9] . It would be useful to extend the results of this study to these models.
Appendix: Summary of Lattice Theory: Definitions and Results
In this appendix, we summarize some properties of lattice theory on a finite set that were used herein. A.1. A partially ordered set and a lattice Let X be a nonempty finite set and ⪰ be a partial order on X, i.e., ⪰ is a binary relation that is reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric.
For a subset Y of X,ŷ ∈ X is referred to as an upper (lower) bound on 
